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Abstract—Air traffic management research lacks a framework 
for modelling the cost of resilience during disturbance. There is 
no universally accepted metric for cost resilience. The design of 
such a framework is presented and the modelling to date is 
reported. The framework allows performance assessment as a 
function of differential stakeholder uptake of strategic 
mechanisms designed to mitigate disturbance. Advanced metrics, 
cost- and non-cost-based, disaggregated by stakeholder sub-
types, will be deployed. A new cost resilience metric is proposed. 
Keywords–complex networks; disturbance; resilience; resilience 
metrics; stakeholder uptake; strategic investment 
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behalf of the SESAR Joint Undertaking (SJU) and the European 
Union as part of the SESAR Exploratory Research programme. 
Opinions expressed in this work reflect the authors’ views only. 
EUROCONTROL and/or the SJU shall not be considered liable for 
them or for any use that may be made of the information contained 
herein. The Deutsches Zentrum für Luft- und Raumfahrt (DLR) is 
project partner with the University of Westminster and Innaxis. 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The primary objective of the ComplexityCosts project is to 
better understand air traffic management (ATM) network 
performance trade-offs for different stakeholder investment 
mechanisms. We define such mechanisms as those designed to 
afford resilience for one or more stakeholders during 
disruption, and to which we may assign a monetary cost. Hence 
they may be considered as ‘investments’, and quantified as 
such – since we are also able to monetise their impact. As a 
simple example, an airline may strategically add buffer to a 
schedule in order to mitigate tactical delay costs. We include 
both advanced and basic mechanism types, in order to compare 
the relative efficacy of simpler (often cheaper) solutions with 
those afforded through the implementation of advanced 
technologies. The types of mechanism are further differentiated 
as shown in Table I. 
To better reflect operational realities, for each investment 
mechanism ultimately adopted in the model the rate of 
adoption will be differentially assessed within the stakeholder 
groups, for example as a function of the airline business model 
or air navigation service provider (ANSP) ownership structure. 
Although high-level roadmaps have been developed within the 
ATM Master Plan [1] and associated contexts (such as the Pilot 
Common Project [2, 3]), the ComplexityCosts model will 
refine the relationship between selected mechanisms and 
stakeholder uptake. 
TABLE I. MECHANISM CLASSIFICATIONS 





SESAR Essential Operational Changes* and 
sub-components thereof (or equivalent 





Non-advanced, does not centrally involve 
implementing new technologies/tools. 
Airline adding buffer 













Primarily aimed at mitigating the impacts of 
disturbance; may be more loosely considered 
as targeting unexpected demand patterns. 





Primarily aimed at improving the nominal 
(according to plan) functioning of the system 
(e.g. by increasing capacity); may be more 




* See Section III(C); †non-mutually exclusive.
Whilst some components of the model are already 
implemented, our focus is very much on reporting the design 
thereof, its wider methodological framework, and the context 
of resilience in complex networks. 
Having cause to frequently refer to disturbance, we define 
this at the outset as an event, either internal or external to a 
system, capable of causing the system to change its specified 
(stable or unstable) state, as determined by one or more 
metrics. This will be expanded upon further both in the 
discussion on defining resilience (Section II) and on the 
modelling itself (Section III). Each model scenario comprises a 
given set of starting (input) conditions, not only defining the 
disturbance, but also including the input traffic, assumed 
capacities, and mechanisms applied. In this paper, we describe 
both the model design and the mechanism selection process, 
with a focus on the supporting metrics. 
II. RESILIENCE IN CONTEXT
The objective of Section II is to consolidate some of the 
key literature on complex networks, especially where these 
have addressed the issue of defining and measuring resilience. 
Complex systems are those that display collective behaviour, 
which cannot be predicted through analyses or modelling of the 
individual components, but which emerges instead from the 
interactions between them. All complex systems have 
interconnected components, such that complex networks play a 
central role in complexity science [4, 5]. Many of the roots of 
complexity science can be traced back to statistical physics, 
non-linear dynamics and information theory [6]. Moving 
beyond a definition of resilience, we will conclude the section 
by examining the particular challenges associated with the 
design of corresponding metrics in ATM. 
  
 
Fourth SESAR Innovation Days, 25th – 27th November 2014 
 
 
A. Wider perspectives 
TABLE II.  NETWORK PROPERTIES ACROSS MULTIPLE DOMAINS 






























































































































Key. E = energy; € = monetary 
 
Table II synthesises a literature review exploring the 
commonalities of complex networks: the energy that drives 
them and the disruptive actions and frictions which impede 
their flows – across the domains of biology [7, 8], ecology [9–
10], utilities [11–15], transportation [16–19] and 
telecommunications [20–22]. Commonalities may be observed 
even across these diverse domains. Nodes represent collections 
of assets (as a generic term for the mobile entities in the 
network – all with intrinsic value to the system) that need to be 
transported along edges and through various media. Such flows 
are all driven by some form of energy. This is typically counted 
in monetary terms within the transportation sectors, although it 
could be expressed as a fuel burn energy, inter alia. These 
flows may be disrupted by breakage or loss of capacity, and 
work against metaphorical and literal forms of friction. 
Real-world networks are often co-dependent, such as laying 
water pipelines under roads, water distribution networks being 
powered by electrical pumps and inter-modal transport 
exchanges. More rarely, a vital edge in one network (such as a 
main road) could be the disruption event for an edge in another 
network (e.g. prohibiting safe species dispersal). Unlike other 
(biological) transport networks, the network formed by fungi is 
not part of the organism – rather, it is the organism. 
A number of these networks also share common functional 
themes. Capacity is expressed through various metrics, such a 
pipe diameters, cable bandwidths, (aircraft) seating 
configurations or vehicle (aircraft) movements. 
Telecommunications terminologies for hub-and-spoke 
networks such as (packet) scheduling, service denials, 
backbones, routing protocols (with distance restrictions), traffic 
delivery rates, traffic forecasts, and (node) diversions have 
obvious analogues with air transport. We often talk of 
‘downstream’ propagation effects were the terminology is 
literal in the context of water distribution and metaphorical in 
others. 
There is an implicit trade-off that pervades transport 
systems, which is particularly closely echoed in 
telecommunications: hub-and-spoke networks are especially 
efficient from an economic and design perspective but they are 
also particularly susceptible to system failure or targeted attack. 
(There is a wealth of literature on this that we do not have 
space to review here.) Rerouting during disruption is a 
common theme across many types of network. Sometimes this 
is (practically) instantaneous, for example in the water 
distribution and telecommunications contexts. In the latter, data 
are insensitive to the routing (unlike passengers), as long as 
they are distributed within corresponding time constraints. 
Whilst changes of route are possible in air transport, changing 
mode or destination is much less common. System 
responsiveness during disruption is often described as 
resilience. However, we need to formulate a more precise 
definition of this within our modelling framework. 
B. What is resilience? 
Regarding an agreed definition of resilience, it has been 
pointed out in a recent review [23] that too many different 
definitions, concepts and approaches are being used, such that: 
“ […] some definitions of resilience overlap significantly with 
a number of already existing concepts like robustness, fault-
tolerance, flexibility, survivability and agility.” An overview of 
the evolution of the term in various fields of research is 
presented in [24]. A thorough review with numerous ATM 
examples is in preparation [16]. The first two milestones (see 
Table III) in the development of the term were its initial 
introduction in material testing [25] and the later adoption in 
ecology [9]. The latter led to widespread use of the term in the 
scientific literature. 
TABLE III.  THREE MAJOR DEFINITIONS OF RESILIENCE 
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A third important milestone with relevance to air transport 
was the ‘resilience engineering’ paradigm introduced in 2006 
[26], which led to (broader) qualitative modelling of resilience 
in ATM, from 2009 [27]. 
TABLE IV.  THREE CAPACITIES OF RESILIENCE 
Capacity Key feature 
Key association(s) ATM 
focus 
Absorptive 
network can withstand 
disruption 
robustness; little or no change 
may be apparent 
strategic 
Adaptive 
flows through the network 
can be reaccommodated 






recovery enabled within time 
and cost constraints 
may focus on dynamics/targets; 
amenable to analytical treatment 
tactical 
 
The earlier ‘engineering resilience’ assumes one stable state 
only, with resilience being the ability to return to this original 
state, after disturbance. Ecological resilience, in contrast, refers 
to absorbing disturbance and access to multiple (stable or 
equivalent) states. An air transport system may also operate in 
(essentially) equivalent states of safety or cost. A recent 
systematic review [28] across numerous domains, categorised 
three capacities of resilience, viz.: absorptive, adaptive, and 
restorative. These are summarised in Table IV. The key feature 
(second column) is taken from [29], to which we have 
appended some key associations and main ATM phases with 
which the capacity may be typically associated – although 
these are not hard and fast. From a performance-focused 
perspective, reliability may be considered as the presence of all 
three capacities; vulnerability may be considered as the 
absence of any one of them. For clarity of reference and to 
accommodate a definition of robustness within our framework, 
we align robustness with the inherent strength or resistance to 
withstand stresses beyond normal limits, i.e. the absorptive 
capacity of resilience. In Section II(A) we referred to 
(practically) instantaneous recovery. An example is whereby 
surplus energy or resources are strategically made available to 
the system in order to deal with a tactical failure. In the water 
distribution context, this has been referred to as ‘buffer energy’ 
by [11], and [15] similarly refers to buffer associated with 
increased investment costs and higher maintenance costs. Here, 
the analogy with air transport schedule buffers is clear. In 
general, however, the investment mechanisms in scope in 
ComplexityCosts may confer one or more of the three 
resilience capacities. 
C. Resilience metrics 
We are now equipped with sufficient resilience definitions 
to explore the corresponding metrics. Output metrics measure 
system performance. They are represented by both cost and 
non-cost metrics. The latter are briefly discussed in Section 
II(D). Useful in their own right, the former also play a role in 
estimations of the cost of resilience. Most of the investment 
mechanism costs (input metrics) are expected to be paid 
strategically (i.e. as sunk costs). However, we must also take 
account of any tactical costs associated with the investment 
mechanism – such as runway operation, or variable fuel burn 
during aircraft delay recovery, etc. 
 
Figure 1.  State diagram. 
Source: adapted from [23]. 
Fig. 1 shows that initially a system exists in some stable 
reference state, S0. A disturbance (disruptive event) triggers 
system disruption (due to internal or external factors) and the 
system enters a disrupted state, Sd. In response, resilience 
action is taken, which triggers system recovery, enabling the 
system to revert to a recovered state, Sf (which, we note, could 
be the same as, or different from, S0). In the simplifying case 
td  ts, there is (practically) no steady disrupted state, Sd. 
(Returning to the absorptive resilience capacity, we observe 
that where te  tf, (perfect) robustness is indicated, and the 
resilience action may be implicit – such as the consumption of 
schedule buffer.) With reference to Fig.1, developing a metric 
for resilience, [23] commences with the formulation (1), where 
Я(t) is the resilience of a system at time t. This thus describes 
the ratio of recovery at time t to loss suffered by the system due 
to a disruption event from te to td. If the recovery is equal to the 
loss, the system is fully resilient; if there is no recovery, no 
resilience is exhibited. [18] uses similar ratios in the urban 
context: a relatively rare example of work using real estimated 
costs. 
 Я(t) 
           
         
 
The authors [23] go on to define a quantitative ‘figure-of-
merit’ function, F(●), which specifies a system-level delivery 
metric. It is time-dependent and changes as the system state 
changes. Multiple metrics could be included and combined 
with appropriate weights. Such inclusion is often a model 
requirement, as in ComplexityCosts for all output costs. 
However, since all of these metrics are cost functions, weights 
are not required in our model. Equation (1) is expanded (ibid.) 
to embrace a conditional figure-of-merit under a given 
disruptive event, and then further conceptually extended to 
include the time and costs required to restore the disrupted 
components. Such situations are illustrated with specific regard 
to investment mechanisms in Fig. 2, where the systemic impact 
(SI) on a network resulting from disturbance is illustrated. This 
event reduces a system performance metric, which returns to 
some nominal (target) level after a period of time, through 








Figure 2.  Resilience-enhancing investments. 
Source: adapted from [29]. 
SI is the area of the degraded performance, as shown in 
panel 1(b). The total recovery effort (cost) represents the 
cumulative resources used in a given recovery. Varying 
strategies for recovery may affect the SI and require different 
levels of recovery effort – see panel 2(a). Investment 
mechanisms implemented strategically would hopefully result 
in a reduction of the tactical magnitude of the disruption from a 
given disturbance, in addition to speeding up the system 
recovery – see panel 2(b). These expenditures are defined [29] 
as “resilience-enhancing investments”. 
As is pointed out (ibid.), when designing for resilience, it is 
important to consider all three elements: (i) systemic impact 
(SI); (ii) total recovery effort, and; (iii) resilience-enhancing 
investments. These will vary across the (disruption) scenarios 
modelled. The sum of the first two elements ((i) and (ii)) 
represents the total cost impact, and needs to include any 
tactical costs of the investment mechanism itself, as mentioned 
earlier. The SI measurement must include all the relevant 
performance metrics. 
Complementing such discrete (sic.) treatments (ibid.) of 
performance curves, an extensive paper [30] reporting on an 
optimisation procedure for the restoration activities associated 
with the bridges of an urban network severely damaged by an 
earthquake, cites (2) as a “broadly accepted” formulation of 
resilience. 
 R 
 ∫       




Here, the resilience index, R, is defined as the normalised 
integral over time of the network functionality, Q(t). R is 
dimensionless and takes values in the range [0%, 100%]. In 
this formulation, t0 is the time at which the disrupting event 
occurs and th is the investigated time horizon. In the specific 
case of the urban road network in the context of bridge 
damage, Q(t) is a percentage based on traffic flows normalised 
with respect to all bridges open and all bridges closed. For 
wider reviews of resilience metrics, see [16] and [28]. We next 
move forward to consider the specific ATM context. 
 
D. Metrics in the ATM context 
In all domains, ATM being no exception, metrics are 
needed that are intelligible (preferably to the point of being 
simple), pertinent (in that they accurately reflect the aspect of 
performance being measured) and stable (we cannot refine 
them from one period to another without losing comparability). 
Let us consider some particularities of dealing with connecting 
flights in an air transport network, and measuring resilience. 
Firstly, the time over which a recovery occurs is difficult to 
assign. For a three hour flight, departing ten minutes late but 
arriving on time, how much time should be assigned to the 
required recovery? It could be effected during part of the en-
route phase by increased speed, or realised on arrival due to 
schedule buffer. In either case, the recovery did not take three 
hours to achieve and the real impact is only on arrival. It is 
here, at the destination airport, measuring the actual arrival 
time relative to the schedule, that any delay impacts on other 
rotations, crew changes and passenger connections. It is here 
also that delay propagation effects come into focus (although 
normally only triggered by delays somewhat greater than ten 
minutes). Indeed, these propagation effects persist over many 
causally linked rotations during the rest of the operational day 
– as quantified in [17], for example. We thus propose to use 
one operational day in European airspace as the boundary 
conditions for such analyses. Defining the scope of the 
resilience, we propose causal summations with specific regard 
to the mechanism and disturbance applied, with Σm denoting 
summation over events casually affected by the mechanism, 
and Σd for the disturbance. This will allow specific assessment 
of the mechanism, relative to the effect of the disturbance. 
Secondly, we are perhaps in a better situation than some 
other disciplines, whereby mixed-metrics are necessary and full 
costings are not available. Costs very often have to be 
hypothecated, for example by the length of an edge in data 
transmission [20] or a pipe diameter in water distribution [13]. 
By design, our cost resilience metric (RC) will fully comprise 
cost-based components, as a result of the selection only of 
mechanisms that can be monetised (see Section III(C)) and the 
cost of delay modelling described in Section III(E). 
Thirdly, whilst simple ratios satisfy the criterion for metrics 
to be straightforward, they may also be misleading. Take 
example A: a €50 recovery of a €100 disruption. This would 
yield the same simple resilience ratio as example B: a €50k 
recovery of a €100k disruption. Both would give Я = 0.5, 
according to (1), although we would deem the latter to be a 
better return on a €10k investment mechanism. Resilience 
metrics thus need to be understood in the context of these 
absolute values. In addition, a full trade-off analysis needs to 
be performed with regard to the strategic costs of the 
investment mechanisms – i.e. their cost of implementation, as 
discussed in Section III(C). (We plan to report on such trade-
offs in a subsequent paper, and a large part of ComplexityCosts 
is dedicated to these analyses). Resilience ratios are still 
attractive in their interpretability, however. To mitigate 
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assessment units (u, such as flights or passengers) also be cited 
in their reporting, as with p values in statistical significance 
testing. The simple discipline of reporting “RC = 0.5 (n = 1)” 
(example A) c.f. “RC = 0.5 (n = 1 000)” (example B) (n = Σ u) 
at least gives immediate insight that B had the wider reach. The 
cost associated with a disrupted flight or passenger at time t is 
denoted Cu(t). 
Fourthly, we must take account of any tactical costs 
associated with each investment mechanism, Cm(t). We earlier 
gave examples relating to runway operation costs, or variable 
fuel burn during aircraft delay recovery. The final formulation 
is presented as (3). 
    
∑      
 




         





 ∑         
 




             
Such that: 
      
This expression for cost resilience (3) thus measures the 
effect of the investment mechanism with respect to the cost of 
the disturbance without the mechanism. Perfect resilience 
(complete cost recovery) gives RC = 1, and no recovery gives 
RC = 0. If the mechanism were to induce greater costs than the 
disturbance alone, RC < 0 obtains. (The first term in (4), i.e. the 
total cost of the disturbance, could in theory be zero. An 
example would be a relatively small disturbance fully absorbed 
by schedule buffer, due to robustness. However, only 
disturbances with some positive tactical cost will be modelled, 
such that we exclude zero values.) Widening the discussion 
beyond dedicated resilience metrics, it is necessary to include, 
and distinguish between, flight-centric and passenger-centric 
metrics, as these are often uncorrelated – with important 
implications for cost optimisation assessments [17]. These 
wider metric classes comprise both cost-based and non-cost-
based metrics. Examples of the latter are delay magnitudes, 
unpredictabilities, and reactionary metrics. Three of the four 
SESAR key performance areas (environment, cost-efficiency 
and capacity) will be addressed, whereas safety is out of scope. 
Such metrics also allow us to put values of RC into valuable 
context, e.g. regarding passenger and flight delays. Finally, the 
models presented in the literature review were deterministic, 
whereas the ComplexityCosts model will include uncertainty 
(see Section III(A)). Statistical testing will thus be applied to 
the metrics and will be used to filter out non-significant RC 
ratios, for example. 
E. Example application of cost resilience metric 
Table V shows results from a previous (ibid.) network 
simulation of 199 European Civil Aviation Conference 
(ECAC) airports plus 50 major airports beyond this region, for 
a selected day in a busy month (September 2010). 
TABLE V.  AIRLINE COST SAVINGS WITH WAIT RULES MECHANISM 
Scenario modelled  
Total network delay cost … Cost resilience 
… without mechanism … with mechanism (RC) 
Nominal delays € 16.11m € 14.95m** 7.2% 
Increased delays € 17.08m € 16.02m** 6.2% 
                     ** p < 0.01 for cost reduction relative to no mechanism. 
Passenger connectivities and airline delay costs were 
explicitly modelled. An airline decision-making mechanism 
was applied, whereby aircraft wait times for missed-connection 
passengers were estimated on a cost minimisation basis, taking 
account of prevailing flow management conditions and 
expected delay propagation. The net cost reduction across all 
flights afforded by the mechanism corresponds to RC = 0.072 
(n = 29 555) for a nominal (typical) day – an average saving of 
€ 39 per flight. Imposing additional disturbance (stochastically 
increasing the average departure delay across the network by 
one minute), increased the delay costs (p < 0.01) and reduced 
the cost resilience by one percentage point, to RC = 0.062 
(n = 29 555). Further work will enable us to compare these RC 
values with those of other mechanisms. Although these 
calculations currently assume that the tactical implementation 
of the mechanism is without cost (i.e. Cm(t) = 0), it is clear 
from (3) that under nominal conditions for similarly busy days, 
any network tactical cost of up to € 1.16m would still afford 
some resilience (RC > 0) and offer a net saving. Averaged 
traffic figures for the top ten carriers suggest that a 
corresponding monthly tactical cost of up to € 1.5m would be 
typically worthwhile for such airlines. 
III. THE COMPLEXITYCOSTS MODEL  
A. Overview of the model 
The ComplexityCosts model is a stochastic, layered 
network model that will include interacting elements and 
feedback loops. Stochastic elements will include systemic 
disturbance (usually relatively minor disruptions, such as ad 
hoc flight delays), which are not part of the over-arching 
modelled disturbance of the scenarios. A busy September 2014 
traffic day, free of exceptional delays, strikes or adverse 
weather, will form the baseline, with essentially the same 
geographic coverage as that outlined in the previous section. 
EUROCONTROL’s DDR2 service will be used for flight, 
capacity and airspace data. The allocation of passengers to 
these flights, with connecting itineraries and fares, is an 
important part of the model both with regard to the output 
metrics and potential investment mechanisms associated with 
passenger service delivery. The corresponding algorithms and 
calibration processes are currently in development. 
B. Differential stakeholder uptake 
As introduced in Section I(A), in practice, new technologies 
and tools are rarely adopted simultaneously by all users or 
stakeholders. Although high-level roadmaps have been 
developed within the ATM Master Plan [1] and the Pilot 
Common Project [3] (see Section III(C)), the ComplexityCosts 
model seeks to refine the relationship between selected 
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Whilst ANSPs, for example, may be identified by given 
uptake likelihoods for one mechanism (e.g. based on size (en-
route area control centres are classified in [1]) and traffic 
densities / complexities), a different method of assigning 
likelihoods might be used for another mechanism (e.g. 
ownership and regulatory constraints, or position in investment 
cycle). Developing different stakeholder categorisations for 
different mechanisms gives us greater freedom in the design of 
the model and extra power in the usefulness of the outputs. 
Airlines are differentiated in the model by their business 
model into four passenger categories (full-service, low-cost, 
regional and charter), or as pure cargo operators. The latter are 
out of scope for ComplexityCosts since we do not have 
resources to model these delay cost impacts. 
Whilst the International Civil Aviation Organization 
differentiates [31] airports based on ownership, more extensive 
classifications are needed in ComplexityCosts, with regard to 
mechanism uptake. These currently extend to: regulatory 
factors (e.g. controlling expansion); size (e.g. classified in [1] 
according to movements); number of runways; slot 
coordination status; and, hub status. 
We are exploring such categorisations according to the 
terminology and Gaussian uptake distribution for innovation 
adoption lifecycles proposed in [32]. Whilst we will adapt this 
terminology somewhat, we are currently investigating the 
modelling effectiveness of, and data availability for, tripartite 
stakeholder categorisations such as ‘early adopters’, ‘early 
majority’ and ‘late majority’. A particular strength of the 
ComplexityCosts framework is that the metrics can also be 
differentiated by stakeholder sub-types (e.g. types of airline 
operator). 
C. Selecting the mechanisms 
Four basic criteria drive the selection process for the 
investment mechanisms to be considered in ComplexityCosts: 
 a range of mechanisms is desired for comparison, 
covering both advanced and basic types (as 
defined in Table I); 
 a cross-section of procedural, regulatory and 
technological types of change is desirable, 
preferably also addressing different phases of 
flight; 
 both the implementation (strategic) and variable, 
operational (tactical) costs need to be well-known 
or amenable to reasonable estimation; 
 the mechanisms need to be modelled through 
differential stakeholder uptake. 
In principle, it is also desirable to include at least some 
paradigm mechanisms that offer new insights into disruption 
mitigation, e.g. by challenging established conventions and/or 
practices. However, this combination of selection criteria is 
ambitious – the cost data alone being difficult to obtain. It is 
also necessary to control the number of combinations of 
mechanisms and disturbances modelled, to maintain a focused 
set of analyses. 
The SESAR Concept of Operations (henceforth ‘ConOps’) 
is mapped into three overlapping steps [1]. The ‘Deployment 
Baseline’ comprises operational and technical solutions that 
have successfully completed the R&D phase and have already 
been implemented, or are being implemented, and runs up to 
2018. ConOps Step 1 (time-based operations) starts from the 
Deployment Baseline; its deployment phase is from 2014 to 
2025. Steps 2 and 3 (trajectory- and performance-based 
operations, respectively) have deployment targeted for after 
around 2025. The evolution of six key features (e.g. moving 
from airspace to 4D trajectory management) are mapped (ibid.) 
from the Deployment Baseline to Step 3, giving a grid of 
‘SESAR Essential Operational Changes’ and associated sub-
components (e.g. airport CDM). The deployment of SESAR 
technology and procedures has been activated by Implementing 
Regulation (EU) No 409/2013 [33] for the Master Plan. The 
instruments that have been defined to support the deployment 
include ‘common projects’ to deploy ATM functionalities 
(groups of ATM operational functions or services) that are 
mature for implementation and that have been demonstrated to 
have a global, positive business case for the European ATM 
network. The first set of technical and/or operational changes 
to be implemented in the 2014-2024 timeframe has been 
defined in the Pilot Common Project (PCP). It is integrated 
with the SESAR Steps, being the first set of activities between 
the Deployment Baseline and Step 1, which is where we intend 
to position most of the ComplexityCosts model. The PCP is the 
first project that activates this new way for stakeholders and the 
Commission to deploy this modus operandi [2], recently 
adopted by Implementing Regulation (EU) No 716/2014 [34]. 
Through literature reviews, consultation of the ATM 
Master Plan and the SESAR proposal on the content of the 
PCP and the corresponding ATM functionalities [3], plus 
project team suggestions, a list of potential mechanisms was 
developed. A focus was maintained on fairly discrete and 
stakeholder-scalable mechanisms, rather than high-level 
instruments such as Functional Airspace Blocks. Mechanisms 
likely to be used as market-based responses to air transport 
evolution were also in scope, even if not explicitly part of the 
Master Plan. Sources for costs were then sought, with 
additional consideration of (potential) direct sourcing from 
industry. Some of the cost data currently remain at a fairly 
aggregate level (e.g. [3]) and are being investigated further.  
Table VI shows the candidate investment mechanisms so 
far short-listed, in order of appearance in the in-house database 
(i.e. no order of preference implied). The second column 
indicates early promise for the differential stakeholder uptake 
modelling. The final column indicates the availability of 
stronger cost data. Those in italics are thus less likely to be 
modelled, based on the data collected to date. Exploring 
changes to airline passenger reaccommodation policies is 
particularly attractive, as it is outside the planned SESAR 
context, and aligned both with the model’s passenger-centric 
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TABLE VI.  CANDIDATE INVESTMENT MECHANISMS 





Airport CDM*   
En-route capacity planning tools*   
Enhanced DCB (demand and capacity balancing tools)*   
Improved flight planning and demand data*   
Investment in new runways   
Time-based separation*   
Dynamic cost indexing   
Changes to airline passenger reaccommodation policies   
Airlines adding more buffer to schedule   
Increasing ATCO hours in selected sectors   
* Explicit correspondence with SESAR Essential Operational Change or sub-component. 
 
D. Types of disturbance 
The specific types of (non-systemic) disturbance included 
in the model scenarios may be broadly defined by their type, 
frequency of occurrence, localisation (spatial scope), duration 
(temporal scope) and intensity. Notwithstanding qualitative, 
working classifications of these terms (such as ‘rare’ or 
‘unexceptional’ frequencies), it is planned to capture a range of 
disturbances in the model, from volcanic ash clouds to weather 
disruption at one or more proximal airports. Included in the 
disturbance types to be modelled are: weather; ash plumes; air 
traffic flow management capacity restrictions (non-weather); 
strike actions; technical failures; passenger disruptions; and, 
military exercises These disruptions will be generically 
implemented in the model as: en-route capacity decreases; 
ground capacity decreases (including slot restrictions, increased 
separation and runway occupation times); airspace / airport 
closure (and re-routings); flight cancellations and other delays; 
and, passenger flow disruptions at airports (ground access 
and/or connecting delays). 
Data on the disturbance types, enabling the building of 
frequency, scope and intensity models, will be sourced from 
EUROCONTROL (Central Office for Delay Analysis and 
Network Operations Portals [35]) and METAR 
(METeorological Aerodrome Report) data. Issues have been 
identified regarding the resolution of non-unique causal 
identifications from basic IATA delay codes, which may be 
(partly) resolved through sub-codes where available. Some data 
sources are of course better than others. METAR data furnishes 
fully sufficient information regarding the temporal and spatial 
scope of weather events. In contrast, data on strike actions and 
technical failures are available at rather lower resolution. 
Where quality thresholds are not met, the disturbance type will 
not be modelled. However, soft computing (related to fuzzy 
logic) will also be deployed – enabling the model to work with 
suboptimal input data in the context of generating higher-level 
metric estimates. Passenger disruption will be modelled using 
in-house data. Accidents are not planned for inclusion, due to 
their rarity. Some of the planned disturbance types will be 
specifically aligned with given mechanisms, with several one-
to-many relationships having been mapped (not shown). No 
disturbance type is anticipated to be unaffected by all of the 
short-listed mechanism candidates of Table VI. 
E. ATM cost allocations 
We have already observed that the model’s output metrics 
comprise both cost and non-cost metrics. During the course of 
the project, cost of delay values previously published [36] by 
the University of Westminster for 2010, for twelve aircraft 
types, by phase of flight and delay duration, will be updated to 
€2014 values and extended to include two additional aircraft 
types1. These models calculate airline costs separately for 
strategic delay (planned for in advance through the addition of 
schedule buffer) and tactical delay (incurred on the day of 
operations). The former may thus be directly deployed as input 
costs for the basic investment mechanism of adding buffer to 
schedule, to increase schedule resilience (see Table VI). The 
tactical costs will be used in the output metrics. Reactionary 
(secondary) delays, not absorbed by strategically allocated 
schedule buffer, for example, will also be assessed. 
The costs will cover the full range of cost types incurred by 
airlines – fleet, fuel (and carbon), crew, maintenance, and 
passenger costs. Table VII shows the types of costs that 
contribute to the strategic, tactical and reactionary delay cost 
calculations. For example, maintenance costs apply in all cases, 
in contrast to fleet costs that only contribute to the strategic 
phase. Summing across the contributing tactical component 
cost types for assessment units (u) as a function of delay 
duration (t), furnishes Cu(t). These values are thus not only 
useful in their own right (such as estimating the cost of delay of 
a flight) but also in terms of their contribution to the estimation 
of cost resilience (3). 
‘High’, ‘base’ and ‘low’ cost scenarios are designed to 
cover the range of costs for European airlines. Combinations of 
cost scenarios may be used to represent particular airline types. 
For example, an airline operating long-haul flights with a 
modern fleet might be assigned ‘low’ maintenance costs and 
‘base’ fleet, crew and passenger costs. This allows mapping 
onto the four airline types used for the differential stakeholder 
uptake modelling. 
These cost updates will be published for open-access use as 
separate tables, along with the supporting literature reviews and 
summaries of the calculations for 2014. These will reflect 
market trends and regulatory change – e.g. with respect to 
Regulation (EC) 261/2004 on passenger duty of care [38] and 
driving carbon prices [39]. In the published tables, the 
reactionary costs will be statistical (drawing on network-level 
data); in the model itself, they will be explicit and causally 
tracked to the corresponding primary delays (as in [17]). 
TABLE VII.  COST TYPES BY OPERATIONAL PHASE 
Cost to airline Strategic Tactical Reactionary 
Fleet    
Fuel (and carbon)    
Crew    
Maintenance    
Passenger    
                                                          
1 A stakeholder consultation is currently in progress regarding this extension. The existing twelve 




Fourth SESAR Innovation Days, 25th – 27th November 2014 
 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS AND ADVANCING THE STATE OF THE ART 
We conclude with a reflection on some of the 
distinguishing features of the model and how it is hoped to 
develop the state of the art. The model is passenger-centric and 
event-driven. It is passenger-centric in that the core processes 
are aligned with full passenger itineraries rather than individual 
flights, thus better reflecting the true functionality of air 
transport operations. Also, to the best of our knowledge, no 
similar passenger itinerary dataset, with comparable 
geographical scope, exists. Rules already established in the 
model govern passenger connectivities and recoveries from 
missed connections during disturbance. Flight-centric and 
passenger-centric metrics will be compared and contrasted in 
the trade-off analyses to explore the effectiveness of the 
investment mechanisms. Fully monetised metrics will make 
essential contributions to the quantification of resilience. 
Instead of a traditional (sequential execution) programming 
approach, the event-driven model affords better realism in that 
any given event (subroutine) may trigger one or more 
dependent events, with the overall flow determined by an event 
manager. Each actor in the model has associated events, not 
only individual passengers, but also flights, airlines, airports 
and ANSPs. A key functional requirement of the programming 
is to track causal links through the events cascade, e.g. using 
recursive algorithms. This will allow us to not only ascertain 
that a given flight has 30 minutes of reactionary delay, but to 
identify the cause of the associated primary delay and its 
relationship with an investment mechanism, scenario-specific 
disturbance or systemic disturbance. Optimising the event 
manager processing efficiency is a key challenge, and this is 
achieved through parallel events execution (whereby events are 
processed independently and then synchronised) and stochastic 
approximation (instead of reproducing every process in detail, 
non-critical processes are replaced by stochastic models). 
This framework will, it is hoped, advance the state of the 
art beyond current (synchronous) investment assessment and 
improve the understanding of complex interdependencies that 
are often overlooked in trade-off models. Mechanism 
assessment will focus between the SESAR Deployment 
Baseline and ConOps Step 1. Comparing advanced and basic 
investments, we also aim to further the cost-benefit analysis 
state of the art with regard to costed business cases in ATM. 
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